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In 1984,  John Moore commenced legal proceedings against his physician, Dr. Golde, Golde’s 
employers (the Regents of  the University of  California system), and pharmaceutical corporations 
involved in the exploitation of  the Mo cell line, derived from cells removed from his spleen.2 Moore 
was being treated for hairy-cell leukemia, and Golde knew that the lymphokines3 produced by 
Moore’s cancerous cells were potentially very profitable. Moore’s spleen was removed during the 
course of  treatment, and he did not consent to the commercial exploitation of  his bio-waste. The 
plaintiff ’s action lay in the tort of  conversion, alleging that Golde, Quan (Golde’s assistant) and the 
other defendants had effectively converted cells from his spleen into a commercially profitable cell 
line without his authorisation. The California Supreme Court found that Moore did not have an 
action in conversion, as he did not have a proprietary interest in his cells. Moore v Regents has been 
the focus of  much scholarly attention, inviting as it does analysis of  the rights of  the individual to 
bodily integrity and dignity in the context of  the biocapitalist exploitation of  body parts (Rabinow 
1996); the proprietary status of  the cell line itself  as a congealed network of  hybridity (as both body 
part and intellectual product) (Strathern 1996, 535);  the central role of  bio-waste in the burgeoning 
bio-medical life science industries of  the 1980s (Waldby and Mitchell 2006); and as a case in which 
reference to race and nation are utilised in order to illuminate newly emergent biotechnologies and 
their effects on the human (Wald 2005).
1 My sincere gratitude to China Miéville, Sandro Mezzadra, and participants in the McGill Faculty of  Law Legal 
Theory Workshop for their very insightful comments on an earlier draft. The omissions and errors which nonetheless 
persist remain my sole responsibility.
2 Moore v Regents (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120
3  Waldby and Mitchell note: “[l]ympokines are proteins used by the body’s immune system and are of  use and interest 
to many researchers. However, [they] are also notoriously difficult ot produce in large amounts, and so Golde saw great 
economic potential in Moore’s cells.” Waldby and Mitchell, 2006, 88
 In my view, this case provides a moment through which to think about the relationship 
between legal forms of  property ownership, the body of  the legal subject, and the racial. Taking as 
my point of  departure the notion that property ownership, and the body of  the legal subject to 
which ownership rights have historically attached are co-constituted through an analytic of  the 
racial, the dispossession of  Moore, a white male Alaskan engineer, of  his body parts provides yet 
another moment (among so many) to think about how the disaggregation of  the human body of  the 
legal subject might provide an occasion for a radical interruption of  the persistent fantasy of  the 
self-possessed, unitary subject of  rights. The dissenting judgment in Moore v Regents, that of  Mosk J., 
explicitly invokes the spectre of  slavery in arguing that Moore’s self-possession of  his body should be 
protected (see discussion below, at p.___). The literal, biological disassembling of  the body of  the 
self-possessed “I” threatens to place the proper legal subject of  rights in extreme jeopardy, and this 
can only be safeguarded against by recognising a proprietary interest in one’s self. Does the failure to 
preserve the integrity of  John Moore’s self-possession by the majority in Moore v Regents potentially 
unravel the  legal forms of  property ownership that simultaneously rely upon and constitute a 
notion of  the legal subject whose body belies (and has always belied) its own phantasm of  solely 
inhabiting whiteness, as unitary? 
 From what moment, at which point do we enter this old story? That is to say, the 
disaggregation of  the human body with the advent of  biotechnologies and the commodification of  
tissue culture, genetic databases, and other inscriptions of  human life continue to raise a plethora of 
questions about the legal form of  property, the networks of  actors and objects that are productive of 
property,  and the status (ontic, social, cultural) of  the bodies (plant, animal,   human) regulated by 
legal regimes of  ownership. Questions of  how technologies that embed proprietary invention within 
the biological organism itself  collapse long-held distinctions between what is natural and what is 
made, what is social and cultural (Pottage 2007); or how the device of  the patent congeals entire 
networks of  labour and their attendant social relations (Strathern 2005), or shifts the temporal focus 
of  ownership claims from past to future, may be of  great utility in thinking about the shifting status 
of  the human subject as it relates to the racial. Do emergent forms of  property introduce new 
articulations of  the body which in turn, might provide a basis for reconfiguring legal subjectivity? 
Or, does the abolition of  the distinction between an ownership right that refers to an object and the 
object itself, which occurs with the emplacement of  the right (over proprietary technology) within 
the body of  the object perfect the “archaic figure of  ius reale,” rather than reinventing the legal form 
of  property altogether? (Pottage 2009, 230-232) In other words, do emergent forms of  property and 
their theorisations provide new frameworks through which to analyse long-standing and sedimented 
triangulations of  legal form, the body and the racial? 
 Moore’s proprietary claim occurs in the realm of  biotechnologies that begin to re-write the 
human body as disaggregable, and this represents a collapsing of  ontological categories that repeats 
itself  over and over, in different guises, from the time modern property law emerges in the colonial 
context. For instance, Best explores how the Fugitive Slave Laws, by rendering the distinction 
between slave as object of  ownership and subjective agent who incurs a debt through refusing to gift 
her labour to the white master totally ambiguous, lays the foundations for the disarticulation of  the 
body and the recognition of  intellectual property rights in such properties of  the body as the voice 
(Best 2004, 81). Best writes:
The figuration of  the fugitive as debtor produces a willful subject against the express legal 
nullifcation of  willfulness. To be precise, it projects a willful subject when the will-less is in 
suspension, fabulates a subject not owned when the owned escapes (to use the language of  common 
law) “absolute dominion,” fantasizes a person at the precise moment when the security of  property 
is subject to greatest question. (Best 2004, 81)
 
This is a moment where the distinction between slave as commodity and slave as a human person 
with volition is collapsed; the strict bounds of  raciality are blurred as the “Negro” becomes legal 
person, if  only for a moment, if  only to be held accountable within a logic of  market exchange and 
legal positivism. In addition to the racial logic of  slavery revealing the germ of  its contradiction, the 
legal form of  ownership itself  is challenged as object of  ownership becomes subject who is caught 
within the contractual relations of  appropriation of  labour, debt and abstraction of  personality, 
upon which property law is built.
 In shifting our focus on property law and its fantasies of  its own stability and the legal 
subject, who in its abstraction, “does the dirty work of  capitalist desires” (paraphrasing Best, 2004, 
63), to a matter of  legal form more generally, the question of  the racial requires us to engage a post-
colonial critique of  capitalism (cf  Chakrabarty 2000; Mezzadra 2011a and 2011b; Ferreira da Silva 
2007). The self-determining, autonomous  ‘I’ was forged during the 18th and 19th centuries in 
relation to beings who fell outside of  the bounds of  cognisability in a burgeoning capitalist economic 
and political system: those whose labour was unfree, enslaved, and those whose lands were viewed as 
non-productive wasteland. For Marx, the legal subject is essentially living a phantasmic existence, 
rooted in the violence of  abstraction and the commodity form. However, Marx’s critique of  the 
chimerical nature of  this subject has had to be stretched (as Fanon noted, discussed below) to 
account for the ways in which the alienation of  labour (the precondition for assuming the status of  
legal-political subject) assumes a subject who is self-possessed, and also, how the capacity for self-
possession and autonomy was thoroughly racialised and emplaced within a colonial logic (Spivak 
1999; Ferreira da Silva 2007).  
 For instance, Fanon’s devastating critique of  the invention of  settler and native explodes the 
distinction between form and substance, by repeatedly exposing how the fact of  blackness (as both 
ontological category and lived experience) pervades the everday life of  the colonial subject. Fanon 
reveals the fantasy of  the autonomous, self-possessed individual whose body is intact as always-
already shattered and fragmented by a racial logic that relies on blurring the boundaries between 
beings (human subjects) and things (the animal, the slave as an instrument of  production). What of  
the proper subject of  the law, who finds quite literally its own body disaggregated by notions of  the 
human inscribed as code?  I seek to explore in the final part of  the essay how (or whether) the racial 
is reconfigured with the disaggregation of  the human body, the form essential to the political 
subjectivity of  the self-determining, autonomous I.  After exploring theories of  the legal form that 
require the stretching alluded to (and executed) by Fanon, I want to shift the focus from the property 
relation as such to consider whether the re-writing of  the human body reconfigures raciality; a 
valence and a logic that has shaped notions of  human (and legal) subjectivity throughout modernity.
 The first part of  the chapter explores theories of  the legal form as elucidated above; followed 
by a section on the relationship between the body and legal form. The final section of  the chapter 
examines the judgment of  Moore v Regents of  USC, a case in which the litigant asserts a right to 
ownership over a cell line produced from cells taken from his body during medical treatment, a 
claim which is rejected by the majority judgment. In the conclusion, I consider the ways in which 
the racial is re-deployed as the body of  the legal subject is re-written not as the sum of  its parts but 
as cells, tissue culture, as code.  I argue that the racial is continually being re-written despite a  
moment of  opportunity presented to us with the advent of  various biotechnologies: to reveal (again) 
the fantasty of  the self-determining ‘I’ as a means of  diminishing its power in the legal and political 
field. Increasingly interrupted by biotechnologies, in the same moment that new forms of  
propertisation, accumulation and appropriation take shape within the law,  we seem to be in a 
moment that presents us with a space to re-shape legal-political subjectivities along different lines.
	
Two theories of  the legal form and some deficits
 The question of  the racial and its relationship to legal subjectivity is one that arises from our 
understandings of  the legal form itself. For both Marx and Hegel, property lies at the basis of  the 
legal form, yet what are the contours of  the legal subject which they both assume in their 
theorisations of  relations of  ownership and contract? While Marx renders a critique of  the 
phantasms that accompany the legal subject as property owner,  Hegel posits ownership as central to 
the very becoming of  the political-legal subject. The concept of  form traverses the social, political 
phenomena that precede and exceed, that shadow the legal form itself. On a Marxist view, the legal 
of  production, property relations, and market forces. Because the legal relation’s content is itself  
wholly determined by the economic relation (Pashukanis 1989, 96), there is no basis upon which one 
should, contra Kelsen (for instance), begin to theorise the legal form from an external vantage point 
of  norms. Thus Pashukanis writes that “the legal relation is the cell-form of  the legal fabric; only 
there does law accomplish its real movement. Compared to this, law as the aggregate of  norms is 
merely a lifeless abstraction.” (ibid, 85) 
 Abstraction functions as a more lively concept through its use, by Marx, as both a 
description and a critique of  capital (Chakrabarty 2008, 58). Marx’s labour theory of  value is 
premised on the idea that the particularities of  different kinds of  labour are abstracted and 
congealed in the commodity as homogenous labour, as a part of  the process by which use values are 
created (Marx 1990, 135-136). The abstraction of  labour is the means by which use values are 
transmuted into exchange values. The violence of  equivalence consists in the flattening of  the 
differences between the labour necessary to produce different dimensions or aspects of  a 
commodity, whereby concrete labour becomes the form of  manifestation of  its opposite, abstract 
human labour (ibid, 150). The abstraction of  labour lies at the foundation of  Marx’s theory of  
commodity formation and thus, the theory of  the legal form elucidated by both Marx and 
Pashukanis.
	 As Marx explains, the violence of  abstraction also lies in its rendering invisible the social 
relations that are necessary for the production of  goods. The very expression of  value (the value-
relation of  the products of  labour within which the commodity appears) conceals a social relation. 
It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for 
them, the fantastic form of  a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy 
we must take the flight into the misty realm of  religion. There the products of  the human 
brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of  their own, which enter into 
relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of  commodities 
with the products of  men’s hands. (Marx 1990, 165) 
This is the definition of  commodity fetishism, a fetishism which is mirrored in the faith instilled in 
legal rights and entitlements that are attached to the legal subject. And it is at this juncture that an 
analysis of  the specificities and particularities of  the individuals who alienate their labour and those 
who cannot, and therefore fall out of  the bounds of  cognisability in this theory of  the legal (and 
commodity) form becomes necessary. The congealing of  the multiple dimensions of  labour and 
production in the commodity not only obscures certain forms of  labour and the social relations to 
which they are attached (Pashukanis 1989, 113), but the very subjects of  these forms of  production. 
By defining property law, which lies at the basis of  the legal form, only in relation to the institution 
of  private property defined as a relation between owners in the most formal sense, “jurists… exclude 
everybody but the owner from using and disposing of  the object…. In these abstract prohibitions, 
the concept of  property loses any living meaning and renounces its own pre-juridical 
history” (Pashukanis 1989, 122). While we may want to question what constitutes the pre-juridical 
(and whether this simply means pre-capitalist), the critique of  the way in which property law is 
defined solely in relation to market relations and subjects who have the power to alienate the object 
of  ownership continues to be relevant as contemporary scholarship turns ever more attention to the 
affective, inter-relational, and social dimensions of  propertisation and ownership.
 That property becomes the central focus of  the theorisation of  legal form is of  no surprise. 
Marx emphasised that the property relation is the fundamental basis of  the legal system. Because 
property becomes the basis of  the legal form “only when it becomes something which can be freely 
disposed of  in the market” (Pashuakanis 1989, 110), different ways of  being, and different beings 
themselves are cast out from this regime of  private property and legal recognition.  He who is a 
slave, as a mere commodity, can only become a subject with legal personhood when he is able to act 
as someone who can dispose of  commodities and participate in the market (Pashukanis 1989, 112, 
note 12). 
 Defining legal personality on the basis of  one’s status as private property owner is nowhere 
more explicit than in Hegel’s  Philosophy of  Right. For Hegel, private property ownership was central 
to the constitution of  the legal political subject. It was only through the recognition of  one’s will, 
externalised into the object of  ownership, that one became a full legal person.  The Philosophy of  
Right is an attempt to theorise the simultaneous unfolding and development of  the individual 
person’s struggle for freedom in relation with others, and finally, through the reconciliation of  the 
individual and universal Will as it is embodied in the ethical State. The realisation of  the Idea, or 
concept, is governed by an inherent rationality; one that moves from the immediate rationality of  
the individual human being to the external world and relations with others and is finally realised in 
its universal form. Property ownership is central to this unfolding when considering rights in their 
abstraction and is also retained and held intact within civil society.
 Of  prime import to the self-determining subject is the struggle to reconcile his subjective will 
with that of  the universal will. The will is the means through which freedom is actualised; it is the 
vehicle through which thought “translates itself  into existence” (Hegel 1991, 35). The will is both 
the medium through which the self  is reconciled to the universal — the will becomes one which has 
“being in and for itself ” — and the locus of  the desire and thought that propels the self  through its 
dialectical progression towards mutual recognition with others and reconciliation with the universal 
(Hegel 1991, 52).
 The capacity and desire of an individual to externalise his will in an object establishes  
private property ownership as the necessary pre-condition of recognition by and of others, and 
relatedly, founds the distinction between rational human beings and human beings who have yet to 
realise their individual personality in its completeness. In order to become embodied as a rational 
human being, the subject must “go out of himself ” and “educate himself inwardly, in order so that 
he may become rational ‘for himself ’” (Hegel 1991, 45). The merely natural or immediate will is 
posited and embodied in an object and thus becomes  capable of recognition by another being.  In 
the movement of the “absolutely free will” in its  abstract state towards its embodied being as a 
personality in the ‘real’ world, property takes on a central role (Hegel 1967, para 34).  In order for 
the free will, the individual self-consciousness, to become a personality capable of holding legal 
rights, it must externalise itself in an object. Externalisation of the will in an object, and possession 
of that object (although that can take many different forms) is  necessary for the free will to confront 
and relate to the external, ‘real’ world of things, and, also, to take on a form that will be recognised 
by other individuals. Thus the abstract will becomes embodied and gains  recognition as such by 
another individual through his own possession of  objects. 
 The contradiction inherent in externalising one’s  will into an object already occupied and 
owned by another results in what Hegel’s refers  to as a ‘madness  of personality’ (Hegel 1991, para 
62).4The madness  of personality results when there is no mediation between my exclusive, 
individual will and that of another in a single object (Hegel 1967, para 62). Ownership asserted by 
Europeans over land already occupied and used by Aboriginal communities; ownership asserted 
over self-possessed human beings  as objects to be owned makes  it tempting to conclude that a 
madness of personality is an apt description for the colonial settler context, were it not for the 
ascription of lower or less developed states  of consciousness  to Aboriginal communities, or for that 
matter, slaves. The will is  crucial, as  an enabling capacity, for the fulfillment of individuated human 
subjectivity. The slave has the capacity to reach this level of consciousness but not without engaging 
in a struggle for recognition. If the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right are understood as 
texts  that unfold in a non-linear, non-chronological fashion, the slave to the contrary, seems to be 
very much caught within a progressive telos of development in which advancement can only be 
made through risking his life in battle. The slave is not only understood as  having a lower or lesser 
developed form of consciousness, but moreover, Mbembe’s  critique of this  Hegelian politics  of 
4 The issue of  owning property that is already owned by another, for Hegel, is an impossibility because the object of  
ownership already contains or is replete with the will of  the original owner. I can use, in a partial or temporary sense, a 
thing, but this form of  possession is to be distinguished from ownership (Hegel 1967, para 62). The object contains a will 
that is impenetrable by my will. When I own something, that thing takes on an “independent externality” and is not just 
limited to my presence, to my knowledge and will in the present time and space (Hegel 1967, para 56). Recognition 
between two individual wills occurs through property; it is my individual will that is recognised through the medium of  
property by another individual will. Thus, there is a contradiction where two wills are present in the same object, and 
recognition is rendered an impossibility.
death reveals  how this  telos  sets  the scene for sovereign control over the biopolitical reproduction 
and death of the racial subject in the post-colony (Mbembe 2003). While slaves have the capacity to 
fight for the realisation of truth through the coming into being of self-consciousness  (as  opposed to 
mere consciousness), it is  beyond dispute that Hegel’s play of world history places  the colonial world 
as  lagging behind Europe. The madness of personality is resolved by the force of property law that 
excluded colonised subjects from the bounds of  the wilful, self-determining, autonomous ‘I’. 
 The self-determining subject is, however, even in Hegel’s own political-theology, a fractured, 
dislocated, disaggregated thing. It defies the absolute certainty, and thus the ontological closures  that 
Hegel’s dialectical logic is  often accused of. Hegel as the author of a dialectic of recognition that 
entails  violent closures  in ontological and phenomenological registers, is also author of a text in 
which a resolutely dislocated body appears  as Unhappy Consciousness. Even before the arrival of 
Unhappy Consciousness,  Butler reminds us  that the emergence of the body in the master/slave 
dialectic occurs, and it occurs  as a moment of alienation. The self recognises itself but also 
recognises  that it is  not itself. Butler argues  that the “self-recognition [of the bondsman] is derived 
from the radically tenuous status of the bondsman”: he recognises himself in the forfeiture of the 
signature and the constant threat to his  autonomy that the expropriation of the objects  of his labour 
presents  (Butler 1997, 39).  This body constitutes  my life, notes  Butler, but this  body there is  equally 
me. I am in other words, both here and there; echoing the fractured subjectivity that migrants  and 
refugees, to think of one example, inhabit as a matter of course (see Bhandar 2011). There is a 
spatial indecision that Butler speaks of that indicates  a moment of being simultaneously embodied 
and alienated from oneself. In this moment, the self is  not concerned with mastery but with trying 
to apprehend and give meaning to its split self; a split that is  the very condition of its being. 
However, I refer to the ways in which Hegel forecloses  these ruptures, particularly in relation to the 
body of  the slave or non-Europeans, as discussed above.
 Marx undoes this self-determining, autonomous ‘I’ who is co-emergent with capitalist relations  
of production. Noting that mutual recognition as legal subjects  can only occur as  owners of private 
property,  (Pashukanis 1989, 114; Marx 1990, 178); Marx, and Pashukanis  after him, illuminate the 
false foundation of the ‘will’ and ‘freedom’ of the legal subject in a capitalist liberal democracy. 
Commodity exchange itself presupposes a conscious act of will on the part of the owner of the 
commodity in the context of the market, even though the commodity itself “acquires its  value 
independently of the will of the producing subject  (Pashukanis 1989, 112). As the owner is 
constituted within and by a juridical frame, “economic relations of ownership then give this  subject 
a gift- (in compensation as it were) - a will, juridically constituted, which makes him absolutely free 
and equal to other owners of commodities  like himself ” (Pashukanis  1989, 114). Freedom and self-
determination are inextricably linked, and indeed, expressed solely through market relations  of 
exchange. This is what freedom means for the legal subject (or property owner).
 The bounds of  the self-determining, autonomous ‘I’ have been the site of  contestation since 
its emergence in philosophical and political domains. Different forms of  anti-colonial resistance  
have both attempted to stretch the bounds of  the legal subject to include the colonised and to 
shatter them completely. The legal form, as dialectic, has been critiqued for failing to allow for the 
existence of  a genuinely emergent plurality, rendering instead forms of  legal pluralism that maintain 
the self-same identity of  the sovereign, European, nation-state form or equivalent. It would be 
uncontroversial, I think, to argue that the legal form, as becomes manifest in a dialectic of  
recognition between nation states or between state and legal subjectivities that emerge in the 
modern colonial era, rely upon an analytic of  the racial.  In contemporary colonial settler contexts 
such as Palestine, for instance, the wasteland rationale used to appropriate the lands of  others is still 
employed, reflecting the persistence of  the notion of  a proper subject of  ownership who is quite 
thoroughly saturated with raciality. Colonial logics are de-territorialised and re-temporalised 
repeatedly, all over the globe. 
 In thinking about the body to which the subject is attached, Marxist theories of  the legal 
form enact a different scene of  erasure. Fanon points to the fissures in Marxist philosophy that are 
revealed in Marx’s disregard of  the bodies that signify the racial, and economic relations of  the 
colony:
The originality of  the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality and the 
immense difference of  ways of  life never come to mask the human realities. When you 
examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the 
world is to begin with the fact of  belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given 
species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is  
the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are 
rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time 
we have to deal with the colonial problem. (Fanon 2001, 31, my emphasis)
The flight into the mystical realms of  religion, a pre-condition for the realisation of  a commodity 
fetishism which by definition obscures social relations between men is not afforded to the colonised. 
In the colony, economic relations never mask the violent social relations that characterise life there. 
 Fanon’s observation that one must begin with considering whether the colonial subject 
belongs to a given species makes precisely the interjection into the notion of  human subjectivity that 
is needed in an anti or post-colonial reading of  Marx. He raises the biological dimension of  being 
and here and elsewhere brings into focus the very constitution of  the body of  the colonial subject 
(Bhandar 2011).  Marx’s concept of  species-being is subjected, and needs to be subjected to this sort 
of  thorough shaking from the outside. How does the very notion of  the human species need to be 
re-thought in light of  colonial violence? If  the human person is only recognised as a legal subject 
through the externalisation of  his will (which the colonised subject by definition lacks) in an object 
(which the colonised subject cannot own), to which species does the colonised belong?  That the 
colonised subject is de-humanised, and indeed animalised is not a particularly contentious claim 
(Fanon 2001, 34). 
	 More specifically, the body of  the colonial subject, the body of  the slave, has always been 
fragmented in multiple ways. Skin as a site of  desire, as a site of  wounding, that has a political-
economic and symbolic significance all of  its own (Fanon1967; Povinelli 2006); the dismemberment 
of  the body that characterised colonial forms of  domination in Africa (Mbembe 2003, 2011); the 
living death (Mbembe 2011) that characterises the colonial condition and the fact of  blackness 
(Fanon 1967) that shapes the lived experience of  colonial subjects in a non-totalising but dramatic 
fashion (Moten 2003), are all instances of  the myriad ways in which the colonial (and slave) body has  
been disaggregated by a racial logic of  subordination, with which as I have attempted to show, 
propertisation and the legal form were thoroughly imbricated.  
 Before, however, attempting to imagine a different species-being that is not bound by the 
strictures of  the self-determining ‘I’ of  capitalist-colonial economic relations,  a different kind of  
accounting of  the subject needs to take place. The disaggregation of  the body of  the proper, 
autonomous self-possessed legal subject as a result of  advances in the life sciences industries has 
placed the form of  this subject at risk. The hyper-commodification of  the body touches the 
subjectivity of  the self-possessed “I” that has hitherto had its fantasy of  self-sovereignty protected by 
a legal form that assumed and relied upon it. In the following section, I offer an analysis of  Moore v 
Regents of  USC, taking note of  how the California Supreme Court grappled with the challenge to 
Mr. Moore’s bodily integrity and assertion of  ownership over materials derived from his body. In the 
conclusion, I return to the question of  the racial logic that persistently haunts the legal subject, and 
speculate on the productive challenges the disaggregation of  the body of  the legal subject might 
hold for legal-political subjectivities.
Moore v Regents: self-possession interrupted
 In the case of  Moore v. Regents of  University of  California, the Supreme Court of  California addressed 
the issue of  whether John Moore, the plaintiff  and appellant, had a legal cause of  action for breach 
of  the physician’s disclosure obligations and for conversion.5 The facts of  the case, briefly, were as 
follows: John Moore underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the Medical Centre of  the 
University of  California at Los Angeles (UCLA Medical Centre) in 1976. The doctors who treated 
him were aware that certain blood products extracted from Moore during the course of  medical 
testing for his condition were “‘of  great value in a number of  commercial and scientific efforts’ and 
that access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would provided ‘competitive, 
commercial, and scientific advantage.’” (P.1 of  40). Eventually in that same year, one of  the 
defendants, Moore’s treating physician Golde, recommended that Moore’s spleen be removed in 
order to slow the progress of  the disease. Moore signed a consent form authorising the splenectomy, 
however, neither Golde nor Quan, another physician defendant, informed Moore  of  their plans to 
use parts of  his spleen for research.  Nor did they request his permission.  In fact,  Golde negotiated 
agreements for commercial development of  the cell line (derived from Moore’s cells) and the 
products to be developed from it. Golde became a paid consultant with the Genetics Institute, and 
“acquired 75,000 shares of  common stock” in the company. “Genetics Institute also agreed to pay 
Golde and the Regents ‘at least $330,000 over three years, including a pro-rata share of  [Golde’s] 
salary and fringe benefits, in exchange for… exclusive access to the materials and research 
performed’ on the cell line and products derived from it.” (P3 of  40)                                                     
The deal that Golde reached with Genetics Institute was very lucrative indeed. The University 
obtained a patent on Moore’s cell line, which covered various methods for using the cell line to 
produce lymphokines. Moore estimated that the market for such products would reach a value of  
approximately 3 billion USD by 1990. 
 The Supreme Court found that Moore did not have a cause of  action on the basis of  
conversion, but that he did have a cause of  action for breach of  a physician’s fiduciary duty to 
5 Conversion is a tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.
disclose. The Court considered whether the theory of  conversion should be extended to apply to an 
individual’s biological materials, and rejected this claim on three bases. The first was that “a fair 
balancing of  the relevant policy considerations counsel against extending the tort. Second, problems 
in this area are better suited to legislative resolution. Third, the tort of  conversion is not necessary to 
protect patients’ rights” (p 12/40). The Court concluded specifically that the use of  excised human 
cells in medical research did not amount to a conversion. The reasons for the rejection of  the 
conversion claim are taken up most pointedly in Mosk J’s dissenting judgment, which I discuss 
below. However, what is clear from the majority’s rejection of  this claim is that Moore’s body parts 
were clearly being taken into the proprietary realm by Genetics Institute and the physicians, but 
were taken out of  his proprietary control. The bodily aspects of  subjecthood travel into  the realm 
of  policy objectives and social goods, and the commercial domain within which scientific innovation 
is lodged and sustained is hived off  into a putative private realm.  The body of  the self-possessed 
legal subject in this instance becomes resolutely non-proprietary in relation to itself, while 
corporations engaged in the business of  the life sciences potentially profit enormously from the 
bodily parts of  the legal subject.  One of  the strongest justifications for rejecting the plea to extend 
the doctrine of  conversion to apply to Moore’s biological materials was the uncertainty that it would 
inject into the market of  the life sciences and medical research:
Indeed, so significant is the potential obstacle to research stemming from uncertainty about legal 
title to biological materials that the Office of  Technology Assessment reached this striking 
conclusion: “[R]egardless of  the merit of  claims by the different interested parties, resolving the 
current uncertainty may be more important to the future of  biotechnology than resolving it in any 
particular way.” (OTA Rep., supra , at p. 27 .)
The Court concluded that they “need not, however, make an arbitrary choice between liability and 
nonliability. Instead, an examination of  the relevant policy considerations suggests an appropriate 
balance: Liability based upon existing disclosure obligations, rather than an unprecedented 
extension of  the conversion theory, protects patients' rights of  privacy and autonomy without 
unnecessarily hindering research.”
Recall that this is the 1980’s when the life sciences industry is in its adolescence, and there was 
palpable fear about freezing the development of  this market with potential litigation over the raw 
materials required to fuel this industry. They also drew upon Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S. 
303, finding that Moore’s cells were factually and legally distinct from the patented cell lines and the 
products derived from it, and therefore, he had no property in the cell line.  
 Arabian J. in a concurring judgment, goes much further than Panelli J. in respect of  the 
moral and ethical issues at stake in the claim.  In very prosaic if  not theological language, he finds 
that the plaintiff  “entreats [the court] to regard the human vessel - the single most venerated and 
protected subject in any civilised society - as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges 
us to commingle the sacred with the profane. He asks much.” (P18/40)  Vehement in his conviction 
that human tissue should not be treated as a fungible article of  commerce, he refuses to “deliver the 
majestic force of  the law” to the ground beneath Moore’s claim. 
 Mosk J., in a dissenting judgment, engages property as a bundle of  rights, and finds that even 
where rights in relation to property are diminished, they remain an interest protected by property 
law. (At p25/40) He finds that the same logic applies to Moore’s interest in his own body tissue: 
“even if  we assume that section 7054.4 [of….] limited the use and disposition of  his excised tissue in 
the manner claimed by the majority, Moore nevertheless retained valuable rights in that tissue. 
Above all, at the time of  its excision he at least had the right to do with his own tissue whatever the 
defendants did with it: i.e., he could have contracted with researchers and pharmaceutical 
companies to develop and exploit the vast commercial potential of  his tissue and its products” (p26).  
He re-affirmed the Court of  Appeal’s conclusion that to accept the position of  the defendants, that 
they can own the plaintiff ’s tissue while he cannot, is rife with an irony that is legally untenable. 
Mosk J ultimately affirms the self-determining and autonomous ‘I’ as having property in his or her 
body, and the right to alienate that property for his or her own economic benefit. The ethical 
imperative to protect the body from inhumane and degrading treatment must be vigorously 
defended, and it is here that he explicitly invokes the spectre of  slavery: “The most abhorrent form 
of  such exploitation, of  course, was the institution of  slavery. Lesser forms, such as indentured 
servitude or even debtor's prison, have also disappeared. Yet their spectre haunts the laboratories 
and boardrooms of  today's biotechnological research-industrial complex. It arises wherever scientists  
or industrialists claim, as defendants claim here, the right to appropriate and exploit a patient's 
tissue for their sole economic benefit - the right, in other words, to freely mine or harvest valuable 
physical properties of  the patient's body.” 
 The patenting of  Moore’s cell line was one instance of  a growing “tissue economy” which 
heralded the quite radical shift in notions of  human life. No longer dependent on being a part of  a 
whole, human body, human life exists in in vitro for the first with the cultivation of  the HeLa cells 
(Landecker, 2007). The HeLa cells are referred to in a footnote in this judgment, and not by name. 
The subtextual reference to the HeLa cells in the majority judgment, and the explicit reference to 
the institution of  slavery in Mosk J’s dissent, open onto a discussion of  the place of  the racial in the 
disaggregation of  the body of  this autonomous legal subject. If  the body of  the phantasmagorical 
autonomous ‘I’ has (also) always been fragmented, evinced most clearly by the body of  the racial 
subject, does raciality as a logic implode, or is it reformulated, in these moments when the fantasy is 
explicitly challenged by the re-writing of  the body as cell lines, or as genetic code?
Conclusion: determining selves in an era of  new bodily technologies
When the body comes to be produced differently, and very much not as signifier of  the mind but as 
signifier of   cell or code, how does this reconfigure the racial that was tied to the onto-
epistemological presupposition that privileged interiority and the self-same ‘I’? (Ferreira da Silva, 
2007) Biotechnological innovation makes it difficult to not take notice of  how organisms, parts of  
bodies which are separated from the whole and continue a separate life of  their own (immortal cell 
lines, for instance) fold exteriority into interiority, turning the outside into the inside and vice-versa.  
As we see in Moore v Regents, the self-determination and freedom that are the preserve of  the 
autonomous, legal subject are denied to him as the logic of  new forms of  capital accumulation and 
exploitation (now drawing on the material, physical resources of  the body, rather than its 
expenditure in the form of  labour) emerge with advent of  biotechnologies in the life sciences. 
Indeed, Moore’s very will to exert control over his bodily property, his freedom to contract in 
relation to his property, is denied; despite the fact that the sale of  bodily parts (organs, blood, tissue) 
is not legally prohibited in the U.S. strictly speaking (see Moore v. Regents, per Mosk J.). 
 The onto-epistemological edifice that the modern human subject assumes, as Ferreira da 
Silva reminds us, that particular bodies that signify the mind, whereas other bodies signify 
nature” (2009).  With the disaggregation of  the human body by biotechnologies, the nature/culture 
divide (transposing Ferreira da Silva’s critique into a related idiom), is shored up by intellectual 
property laws that rely upon a distinction between invention and discovery (Pottage and Sherman 
2010). This idea of  self-determination is re-configured by judgments dealing with body parts or life; 
the notion that one should be able to decide autonomously about what happens with one’s very 
body and self, is interrupted by a proprietary regime that maintains a conceptual divide between the 
natural and cultural. The difference here, is that the subject who has always been assumed to be the 
natural progenitor of  rights, self-determination and autonomy is undone by the imperatives of  new 
forms of  appropriation. 
  The legal form, however, still relies on the distinctions between the natural and the social, 
between nature/culture that built the edifice upon which the self-determining, autonomous ‘I’ sits, 
and ends up with sort of  persistent jetlag that won’t let newer inscriptions of  the body live or die. 
Rather, they seem forced into a zombie state with raciality- as both a discourse and philosophical-
scientific apparatus continuing to operate despite radical shifts in the relationship between human 
subjectivity and the body.  
  For instance, in the case of  the HeLa cells, Hannah Landecker notes how the cell line of  
Henrietta Lacks, a young black woman who died of  cervical cancer in the 1950s, comes to be 
described in popular and scientific journals in very racialised-sexist metaphors reserved for black 
women. As a part of  the growing immortalisation of  the human person through the culturation of  
cell lines in vitro, Lacks’ cell line played a primary role as the first permanent strain of  a human cell 
that could be used for experimental use (Landecker 2007, 127).  Landecker notes how raciality and 
scientific innovation become fused with the discovery that HeLa cells had “contaminated and 
overgrown many of  the other immortal human cell culture established in the 1950s and 
1960s” (Landecker 2007, 168).  In 1967, Geneticist Stanley Gartler announced to an audience, that 
having analysed eighteen different cell lines, all had the same profile as the HeLa cell. Because the 
key piece of  evidence was the “profile for a particular enzyme called G6PD... a factor in red blood 
cell production”, Garter concluded that The type of  G6PD variant present in all cell lines was a 
type “found only in Negroes” (ibid, 168-169). Landecker observes that from this point onwards, the 
contaminating  cell lineis marked as black, and the contaminated as white (ibid, 169). From this 
moment onwards, race becomes a key aspect of  the HeLa narrative, with metaphors of  
miscegenation used to describe cells in culture and the threat posed by contamination- one drop of  
HeLa was enough to take over any other culture (ibid, 170). 
 Drawing on an example from the realm of  genetics, Donna Haraway describes how in the early 
1990’s, the organisers of  the Human Genome Diversity Project wanted to adjust the thinking of  the 
mainline Human Genome Project by collecting hair-root, white blood-cell, and cheek-tissue 
samples, to be held in the American Type Culture Collection, from over 700 groups of  indigenous 
peoples on six continents.  She notes that modernist perspectives “distorted the definition of  the 
categories of  people from whom samples were to be sought, leading to a vision of  dynamic human 
groups as timeless ‘isolates of  historic interest’. She notes that other potentially genetically distinct 
ethnic communities did not appear on the sampling list (Haraway 1997, 249). The subject/object 
divide, again, challenged by the very technologies used to map the human genome, such as 
recombinant DNA techniques, remain intact in the way that raciality is understood and signified. 
Blood remains the medium through which raciality is marked, echoing 19th century concepts of  
raciality that buttressed miscegenation laws and eugenics. The body- and changes in how human life 
is conceived of- could interrupt the legal form that wants to cling to late modern proprietary regimes 
of  recognition (perhaps as it always could have), by harnessing the plasticity and instability manifest 
in the body and its parts. It is from a position of  instability that political practices that disrupt the 
spatial fixity and the temporal closure of  a singular, linear telos, which have characterised colonially 
embedded relations of  being and property ownership could emerge.
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